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ADR and the Public Interest
Lorne Sossin, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto

Introduction
ADR’s benefits are well-known and oft-cited. ADR can reduce the cost of dispute
resolution for the parties and the public purse. It leads to more harmonious relations and
more varied and responsive settlements than the adversarial, winner-take-all premise of
civil litigation. It has added attractions for the parties of confidentiality, flexible
procedure, choice of decision-maker, focus on finding workable solutions to problems
and fixed timelines for hearings and decisions.1 As a result of these benefits, it is not
difficult to account for the dramatic rise of ADR providers. As Trevor Farrow recently
observed:
Today, ADR has now become part of the mainstream diet of American and
Canadian practitioners and academics. As one recent source noted, "there is a
growing sense ... that it is time to look beyond adjudication as a single model for
dispute resolution, and to consider instead a spectrum of dispute resolution
alternatives." Students, lawyers, retired judges and other professionals are
increasingly seeking meaningful ADR-related careers. Further, courts at all levels
are both sanctioning and at times mandating this trend. As a result, as one U.S.
commentator recently noted, the American Bar Association (ABA) "Section on
Dispute Resolution Conference, only three years old, is larger than the ABA
Litigation Section Conference." Put simply, the face of the legal profession -- and
in particular the way modern disputes are thought about and resolved -- has
dramatically changed in Canada and around the world over the past decade. 2
(footnotes omitted)

It is less clear that this development serves the public interest. I wish to explore three
reasons why ADR may appear at odds with the public interest:
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These benefits are elaborated in Mr. Justice George W. Adams & Naomi L. Bussin, "Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Canadian Courts: A Time For Change" (1995) 17 Advocates' Q. 133.
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T. Farrow, “SPECIAL ISSUE: CIVIL JUSTICE AND CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM: ARTICLE: Dispute
Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education” (2005) 42 University of Alberta Law Review 741.
See also Trevor Farrow, “Privatizing Our Public Civil Justice System”.

1) Justice should be transparent and be a public process;
2) Settlements do not necessarily entail just outcomes; and
3) ADR takes pressure off the civil litigation system to improve access.

1)

Justice Should be Transparent

The Court is a public space. It is not only where justice is done but also where justice
may be seen to be done. The administration of justice depends as much on public
confidence in the courtroom as on any other variable. There are several dimensions to the
value of transparency in the justice system.

First, proceedings themselves should be public. This includes claims and defences filed
with the Court, as well as the hearings. The exceptions are those aspects of the
proceedings specifically contemplating settlement (for example, pre-trial conferences). A
process aimed at settlement and dispute resolution need not be public and in many cases
will only succeed if it is confidential. Thus, ADR, if it removes dispute resolution from
public view, will be contrary to the goal of transparent administration of justice.

Second, the decisions in judicial adjudication must also be public. The very development
of the common law presupposes one judge’s application of legal principles and doctrines
developed through earlier decisions in analogous circumstances. If no record is kept of
ADR resolutions, the public is deprived of the development of jurisprudence in key areas
of liability.

Third, the decision-makers in judicial contexts are public officials. They derive
legitimacy from their public interest mandate as a separate and independent branch of
government and are accountable to these ideals. ADR may involve a variety of public and
private adjudicators with a wide spectrum of interests and motives.
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2)

Settlements do not necessarily entail just outcomes

Most if not all of ADR, whether court controlled or outside the court, is undertaken with
a view to settling disputes. Adjudication through the courts, however, is about dispute
resolution and other values (truth seeking, the search for just outcomes, deterrence, etc)
Courts must ensure that a just resolution is reached and that the principles upon which
this resolution is founded accord with the law. In his landmark article, "Against
Settlement,"3 Owen Fiss saw settlements through ADR as a kind of civil plea bargaining.
He observed:
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgment or
should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It should be
treated instead as a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets.
Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often
coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of
a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and
although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea bargaining,
settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither
encouraged nor praised.
Fiss in particular was concerned with the distortions created by imbalances of power in
relation to settlement through ADR. Of course, these same imbalances of power have
undermined the effectiveness and inclusiveness of civil litigation long before and since
the advent of ADR.4

While I would not equate ADR with plea bargaining, Fiss’ distinction between dispute
resolution and the pursuit of justice does resonate. There is something unsatisfying,
however, about the dichotomy and the sense that this is an either/or proposition. Is it not
possible for the fair resolution of a dispute through ADR to complement the pursuit of
justice as a public interest goal. Court connected ADR may be one such possibility.
3

(1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073.
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For a broader discussion of the implications of unequal access to civil litigation, see ; Ian Morrison &
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Depending on the variant, ADR connected to a court process gives rise to some degree of
judicial supervision, some degree of public scrutiny and some degree of broader
administration of justice goals beyond simply “trimming” the dockets. In such contexts,
the question may well be what the relationship to the Court and the judicial process adds
to the effectiveness and legitimacy of ADR. Put differently, if the resources of the Court
are devoted to designing, maintaining and/or overseeing ADR, the key accountability
metric for such a program ought to be how it advances the public interest and the
administration of justice. This aspect of evaluating the effectiveness and value of ADR is
relatively undeveloped and merits greater attention.

3) ADR takes pressure off the civil litigation system to improve access.

Access to justice remains a touchstone for the civil justice system. As several recent
studies and task forces have reiterated, few potential litigants can afford to take their case
to court. Too many are self-represented or under-represented. A key solution to this
problem appears to be streaming a significant portion of cases out of the court system and
into alternative streams of dispute resolution. While this may clear backlogs and remove
some of the litigants who cannot afford lawyers from the dockets, it is not clear that this
measurably enhances access to justice. Indeed, a civil court system which exists only to
engage the legal disputes of the wealthy is problematic.

The point of departure for proponents of ADR for a generation has been that civil
litigation is a lengthy, expensive and inflexible route to an uncertain winner-take-all
outcome. Why need this be so? If the civil justice system itself is moving toward streamlining, greater flexibility, more creative case management, etc, then the benefits of ADR
relative to the civil justice system may be diminished. Indeed, it may be seen as a
measure of the success of the ADR movement that so many of its strategies and practices
now may find their way into the civil litigation process itself.

What remains unclear is the normative aspiration of civil litigation reform in relation to
ADR. Should we approach ADR and the civil litigation system and kindred and
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complementary aspects of a dispute-resolution framework, including public and private
elements working in concert, or should we see ADR as necessary only because of the
flaws of civil litigation. If the latter, should the goal of civil justice reform be
“containment” of ADR or should we simply assume ADR would remain a desirable
feature of the justice system irrespective of how successful access to civil justice may
become? These are large questions and the answers may come in shades of gray.
Nonetheless, it is important to ask such questions. Whether ADR serves the public
interest depends in large part on what we understand the goals of the civil justice system
to be.

There is now considerable empirical data which addresses the question of whether ADR
works and how best it may respond to the dispute resolution needs of parties. Such data
cannot, in and of itself, address how well ADR responds to the public interest. When
cases are streamed out of the courts and into ADR, is this a measure of the success or the
failure of the justice system? Perhaps the answer is simply that it is both.
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